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Abstract
Background: Inequity in use of physician services has been detected even within health care systems with
universal coverage of the population through public insurance schemes. In this study we analyse and compare
inequity in use of physician visits (GP and specialists) in Norway based on data from the Surveys of Living
Conditions for the years 2000, 2002 and 2005. A patient list system was introduced for GPs in 2001 to improve GP
accessibility, strengthen the stability of the patient-doctor relationship and ensure equity in the use of health care
services for the entire population.
Method: We measure horizontal inequity by concentration indices and investigate changes in inequity over time
when decomposing the concentration indices into the contribution of its determinants.
Results: We find that pro-rich inequity in the probability of seeing a private outpatient specialist has declined, but
still existed in 2005.
Conclusion: Improved patient-doctor stability as well as better GP accessibility facilitated by the introduction of
patient lists improved access to private specialist services. In particular the less well off benefited from this reform.
Background
Countries that pursue equity in health among their
populations increasingly acknowledge equity in health
care utilization as an important intermediate aim to
approach this goal. Empirical analyses generally show
that these countries tend to succeed well at the primary
health care level [1,2]. For the utilization of specialist
medical care, the picture is different. Inequity in favour
of the well off tends to be the rule rather than the
exception. Even in countries with universal coverage of
the population through public insurance schemes that
ensure access to high quality services at low or no finan-
cial cost, richer and better educated tend to use more
specialist care, conditional on need and other non-need
factors [3].
Research on implications of the organization and
finance of health care for equity in utilization is limited.
Some studies provide evidence that growing markets for
private supplementary health insurance promote
inequity in physician visits [4-6] In two cross-country
comparisons of inequity in physician visits for the EU
[2] and the OECD [1] one seek to explain variation in
inequity of utilization by differences in features of health
care systems. Copayment, permission for specialists to
work in dual (public/private) practices, and high degree
of private provision of insurance and/or specialized
medical care are all features associated with a higher
degree of inequity in the use of medical specialists.
While the gate keeper role of general practitioners
(GPs) seems to mitigate inequity in GP visits, gate keep-
ing is also associated with larger education gradients in
the utilization of specialized medical care [1].
In the current analysis we seek to shed additional light
on the role institutional features of GP practice may
have for equity in doctor utilization in Norway. In June
2001 the Regular General Practitioner (RGP) Scheme
was introduced, and a patient list system was established
for the entire population. The main objectives of the
reform were to improve access to GP-services and facili-
tate more stable patient-GP relationships [7]. We
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investigate if the reform had unintended implications for
equity in GP- and medical specialist utilization by com-
paring the distribution of utilization by income before
and after the reform, using three years of comparable
cross-sectional data from the Norwegian Survey of Liv-
ing Conditions (SLC). We do not claim that causal
effect on equity of the reform is identified in this analy-
sis. Nevertheless, from a health policy perspective, it is
of interest to establish whether equity actually has
improved or been harmed after such a large change in
the primary health care system, in particular since provi-
sion of services according to need, irrespective of place
of residence, socioeconomic conditions or ethnic back-
ground is stated by law as principle for provision of
health care services [4,5].
We find that income-related inequity in the use of pri-
vate specialists has declined but still existed in 2005.
Our analysis shows that the decline is linked to changes
in the responsiveness of utilization to individual socio-
economic characteristics, and we argue that it is reason-
able to link the observed changes in behaviour with
respect to health care utilization to the introduction of
the list patient system.
In what follows, we first describe the Norwegian sys-
tem for provision of physician services. In section 3 we
discuss expected effects of the GP reform. Section 4 pre-
sents the method and section 5 the data. The analysis
and the results are presented in section 6 while discus-
sion and conclusions are given in section 7.
2. Provision of physician services in Norway
The Norwegian health care system is characterized by
tax-financed public provision and universal coverage
[9]. Priority assignment of patients is regulated by the
Act on Patients Rights and the Act on Health Enter-
prises with the aim to provide high quality care depen-
dent upon need, and independent upon socioeconomic
background characteristics and place of living. Below
we explain how the provision of health care services is
divided between the levels of government, and com-
ment on changes that took place during the years
2000-2005.
Primary care
Primary health care is the responsibility of the munici-
palities. Most GPs are self-employed with contracts
administrated by the municipalities. By the end of the
1990s, many municipalities, in particular in rural and
remote regions, experienced difficulties attracting new
GPs for vacant positions. Temporary contracts and a
general shortage of GPs resulted in frequent shifts of
GPs and long waiting times for regular consultations.
The RGP Scheme was introduced in June 2001 to
attract more GPs, to facilitate stability in the patient-
doctor relationship and improve equity in physician uti-
lization. With the list patient system, GPs were responsi-
ble for the provision of primary health care services to
patients belonging to his or her list. At its introduction,
all inhabitants were presented with a list of available
GPs and asked to select three preferred GPs. Seventy-
four per cent sent in this form, and ninety-two per cent
of them were listed with one of their preferred choices
[10]. The rest were given notice that they had been ten-
tatively assigned to a GP. In most cases, this assignment
was accepted, but inhabitants also had the right to
change to another GP, a right that is a permanent fea-
ture of the list patient system. GPs were not allowed to
refuse access to their list as long as they had vacant
slots on their lists.
The RGP Scheme also changed GPs’ remuneration cri-
teria, but a mixed system was kept throughout. A major
component is fee-for-service, where fees are paid partly
by patients themselves and partly by the National Insur-
ance Scheme. Before the RGP Scheme was introduced,
GPs received a practice allowance from the municipality,
the size depending on the number of auxiliaries. After
the reform, practice allowances were replaced by a capi-
tation component depending on list size. Approximately
30% of the income earned by GPs is expected to come
from capitation and the rest from fee-for-service. The
former component used to represent a larger share of
the GP’s total income before the reform. Exceptions to
the mixed system are found in some of the small and
thinly settled municipalities where GPs have been given
a fixed salary both prior to and after the GP reform.
Both prior to and after the reform, GPs served as gate-
keepers for medical treatment by a specialist and for
elective hospital treatment but this system was not fully
consistent, as direct access for some specialised services
existed. Parallel with the reform the gatekeeper system
became more restrictive as referral was made mandatory
in order for the specialist to claim reimbursement from
the National Insurance Scheme. Without referral the
patient can still consult the specialist directly but will
then have to pay an extra copayment. Consultation with
private GPs operating outside the patient list system has
also been possible both before and after the reform.
These GPs are easier to access in urban areas, but must
be paid fully by the patients themselves.
Nearly all GPs signed up for the RGP scheme, and it
also attracted new GP entrants. According to municipal-
ity statistics the number of physician-labour years per
thousand inhabitants in primary care increased on aver-
age from 1.06 in 2000 to 1.15 in 2005. The increase was
larger in large municipalities and in municipalities with
growing populations. Already when the reform became
effective in 2001, 94,6% of the population signed up on
a list with a GP. By 2005, 98.5% of the population had
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signed up. Of these, only 1.3% were signed up on lists
still without a regular GP.
Specialized outpatient medical care
Out-patient specialist health care services are provided
by public hospitals and by private, self-employed medi-
cal specialists or clinics serving the state owned regional
health enterprises (RHE) (owned by the counties before
2002). Provision and funding of services are based on
contracted agreements. There is some scope for compe-
tition in elective treatment as patients are free to choose
their provider on a national basis, but few patients
receive treatment outside of the hospitals’ natural catch-
ment areas [11]. Private providers are paid on a fee-for-
service basis. Medical specialists employed by public
hospitals are salaried. They were also allowed to work
extra hours in private practices outside the hospital
(dual practice). For patients, the level of copayment is
the same regardless of whether treatment is received
from a public or private provider as long as the private
provider has a contract with an RHE and the patient is
referred by a GP.
From 2000 to 2005, the number of private specialists
on a contracted agreements with regional health enter-
prises was stable, but their activity level grew (yearly
growth was 8.9%, 10.3% and 4.3% for the years 2002-
2005 [12]. For specialised outpatient treatment in hospi-
tals the growth in activity level was more moderate
(5.9%, 4.1% and 2.5% for the same period).
As referred to in the introduction, several studies have
pointed to private health insurance as an important con-
tributor to inequities in health care utilization in specia-
list care. In Norway, private health insurance was
virtually non-existent in 2000. Since then, a growing
number of private insurance companies offer supple-
mentary private health insurance that guarantees specia-
list examination and treatment shortly after referral
from a GP. By 2005, about 60,000 persons, correspond-
ing to approximately 2.3% of the labour force, had pri-
vate supplementary health insurance [13].
3. Expected effects of GP reform
The introduction of the RGP Scheme changed GPs’
financial incentives as well as the character of the
patient-doctor relationship. In the following, we will dis-
cuss how these changes might affect income-related
inequality in use of services.
The introduction of capitation payment could induce
GPs to increase the referral rate to provide time for new
patients [14]. The impact of the RGP Scheme on refer-
rals is particularly interesting from an equity perspective,
given that GPs are prescribed a gatekeeper role and that
specialist services was found to be inequitably distribu-
ted before the reform [1]. The introduction of a list
patient system gave a larger part of the population
access to a stable patient-doctor relationship and should
imply that the GP knows the patient better, so that
there is less need to refer to specialist. This was the
effect that policy-makers expected [15]. On the other
hand, contracting the patient -doctor relationship also
increased responsibility for the patients, which could
cause a tendency for the GP to refer, “just to be sure.”
The introduction of capitation also provides the GPs
with an incentive to compete for patients by offering
high service quality [16], and patients may perceive hav-
ing a referral as good quality. In a qualitative study, GPs
themselves express that they perceive their gatekeeping
role as weakened after the reform [17]. The only quanti-
tative study on how the RGP Scheme has impacted on
referrals indicates a rise in referral rates [18]. Their ana-
lysis focuses on whether the patient had a regular GP or
not, and not on the relationship between referrals and
patient SES.
While we find it reasonable to expect more referrals
because of the stronger advocate role and the effect of
competition, the distribution according to SES is not
obvious. On the one hand, several factors could lead to
more inequity in favour of high SES patients: these
patients may be more attractive customers to a GP who
wants to have a large list of patients, because their aver-
age health is better, as shown for instance in [19]. They
may also be more demanding, aware of their rights
within the health care system, or they may be better
informed and have better communicative skills and
therefore be more able to present the severity of their
illness [20] On the other hand, the reform could have a
greater impact on low income patients because they are
overrepresented in remote areas, where discontinuity in
the doctor-patient relationship was particularly frequent
before the reform. Having access to a GP who had a
particular responsibility for them could also give these
patients better access to specialist services. Furthermore,
the more restrictive gate-keeping regulation for referrals
affected patients who before the reform went straight to
the specialist, and high SES individuals are overrepre-
sented within this group. After the reform, some of
them may have decided to drop the consultation alto-
gether or chosen to be treated by the GP instead. In
sum, it is unclear whether we should expect the RGP
Scheme to increase or decrease inequity in use of spe-
cialist services, and we leave this question for empirical
investigation.
4. Methods for measuring and explaining inequity
We are interested in how the use of health services,
denoted y, is distributed according to income when y
represents six different outcomes: the number of visits
and the dichotomous, for GP, private specialist, and
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hospital outpatient visits, respectively. Our survey data
does not allow us to measure the number of private spe-
cialist visits that are financed privately, i.e., out-of-
pocket or by private insurer, as opposed to publicly
financed. We know of no other source of data that
could inform us on this [21].
There is a clear distinction between inequality and
inequity. While inequality simply refers to whether there
is a correlation between a person’s use of services and
the person’s ranking in the income distribution, inequity
on the other hand takes into account individual need
for treatment. Both inequality and inequity can be mea-
sured by concentration indices, which facilitate a com-
parison across different types of health care services and
over time. The methods used are thoroughly described
in [22]. Income-related inequality in use can be
expressed by means of a concentration index CI, which
is a measure of relative inequality:
CI =
2
μ
cov(yi,Ri), (1)
where μ is the mean of y and Ri is the fractional rank
of the ith person in the income distribution. The index
ranges between (-1) and (+1) and takes a positive (nega-
tive) value if the health care variable is concentrated
among the rich (poor).
To study the development of inequity, we first com-
pute a concentration index for horizontal inequity, HI.
To account for need, HI is estimated based on a regres-
sion of y on explanatory variables x. The dependent
variables studied call for non-linear models, and we
have used a probit model for the dichotomous outcomes
variable and negative binominal models for the number
of visits. Given a defined set of need-variables xN and
non-need variables xNN, the need-expected level of care
can be predicted for each individual, which for a non-
linear model is contingent upon the level of xNN. Note
that the non-need variables include income. Setting
non-need variables equal to their sample means, need-
predicted health care use yˆNi is estimated as [23]:
yˆNi = E[yi|xNi , x¯NN] = G(
∑
N
βˆNxNi +
∑
NN
βˆNNx¯NN). (2)
HI is a concentration index for estimated individual
need-standardized use yISi , which is found as:
yISi = yi − yˆNi +
1
n
n∑
i=1
yˆNi . (3)
Computing an HI index as explained above requires
making explicit value judgements about what should be
defined as “need” and “non-need” variables. Our second
approach to analysing inequity leaves this classification
task to the reader, as inequality is decomposed and
attributed to the covariates k as proposed by [24]. Note
that the set of covariates included will not influence the
inequality index (CI), but potentially the horizontal
inequity index (HI). To apply the decomposition method
to non-linear explanatory models, we use a linear
approximation [25]:
CI =
∑
k
(βmk x¯k/μ)Ck + GCε/μ, (4)
where βmk are partial effects of each variable treated
as fixed parameters and evaluated at sample means, Ck
is the concentration index for variable k and GCε is the
generalized concentration index for the error term and
can be computed as a residual. The product
(βmk x¯k/μ)Ck is covariate k’s contribution to the total
inequality observed.
Our main interest is in the change in inequity over
time, which can be analysed using an Oaxaca decompo-
sition [24,26]:
CI =
∑
k
ηk,t(Ck,t − Ck,t−1) +
∑
k
Ck,t−1(ηk,t − ηk,t−1) + GCε/μt (5)
or, using alternative base years:
CI =
∑
k
ηk,t−1(Ck,t − Ck,t−1) +
∑
k
Ck,t(ηk,t − ηk,t−1) + GCε/μt. (6)
Thus, there are two sources for changes in the con-
centration index: First, over time, the underlying deter-
minants k may become less or more concentrated with
respect to income. Second, health care utilization may
become more or less responsive to the k variable. The
latter source is captured by changes in h k, which is
called the elasticity of variable k.
It should be stressed that the analysis is descriptive
and does not claim to reveal causal relationships.
5. Data
We use data from two different sources of SLC. Statis-
tics Norway (SN) conducts annual theme-rotating,
cross-sectional surveys. Every year 5000 persons aged 16
+ are drawn according to SN’s general sampling plan
(institutionalized persons are excluded). Data regarding
working and living conditions and health are collected
through a combination of personal interviews and postal
questionnaires. In addition, data are merged with
administrative records with information regarding
income, social insurance benefits and education. SN also
conducted a panel survey covering the years 1997 to
2002. For this survey, a separate sample of 5000 repre-
sentative individuals aged 16+ was drawn, with addi-
tional 16-year-olds added every year. All individuals
included in this sample are approached every year
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regardless of former response behaviour. Collection of
data is conducted according to the same procedures as
in the cross sections, and formulation and selection of
questions in the panel and the cross sections are to
some extent overlapping across years. Since the ques-
tions regarding doctor utilization and several other rele-
vant questions are identical in the 2000 wave of the
panel and the cross sections in 2002 and 2005, these
years’ samples were the natural candidates for our
analysis.
In all three years, respondents were asked about GP
and medical specialist visits. For GP visits, the questions
used are twofold: i) Have you, during the past 12
months, because of your own health condition, con-
sulted a GP? And, if so, ii) how many times during the
last 12 months have you consulted a GP? For medical
specialists, there are separate questions for out-patient
consultations in hospital and consultations with private
specialist/clinic, and for both cases it is asked for any
visit and, in addition, in the case of at least one visit, for
the total number of visits. Based on this, our chosen
outcome variables are 1) the dichotomous for having
any visit or not, and 2) the continuous for number of
visits to a GP, a private specialist, or a hospital outpati-
ent clinic, respectively.
For the need-standardization of utilization, we include
in addition to age-gender dummies, the standard mea-
sure of health based on responses to the question on
self-assessed health status as either very good, good,
neither good nor bad, poor or very poor. In 2002 and
2005, we have more data on health status. In these
years, we can also include two questions regarding pre-
sence of any chronic physical or mental health condition
and the possible degree of limitation in daily activities
because of this, as well as a variable counting the num-
ber of conditions reported when respondents are pre-
sented with a list of 50 different diseases and health
problems. In all regressions, we follow [1] and include
variables not directly related to need or health status
but still relevant for the utilization of health care ser-
vices. Educational level, marital status and country of
origin are expected to affect the efficiency of health pro-
duction and the propensity to seek care, while activity
status and region of residence are expected to affect the
time price of health care use. In the Norwegian setting,
region of residence is also expected to capture differ-
ences in access to medical services, as many medical
specialist services are located in urban areas, and in the
capital and surrounding areas in particular.
The response rate in the SLCs is stable at around 70%,
with the main reason for non-response being refusal to
participate. We decided to focus on the age group 16-
69, because there are few individuals aged 70-79 in the
2000 sample, and we wanted to have the samples
comparable with respect to age composition as popula-
tion aging in itself leads to increasing income related
inequality in health over time [27]. After excluding
observations with missing data on one or more variables
except educational level, we are left with 3371 observa-
tions in 2000, 2965 in 2002 and 3002 in 2005. As immi-
grants typically are over-represented among respondents
with missing data on education, we decided to keep
these observations in the sample and control for this in
the regression analyses by including a dummy for miss-
ing data on education. Means and standard deviations
for dependent variables and covariates in all three sam-
ples/years are listed in Table 1. For utilization of physi-
cian services, we see that the percent of the respondents
having consulted a GP at least once during the last 12
months is somewhat lower (70%) in 2005 than in 2000
(72%). The average number of GP consultations as well
is lower in 2005. The probability of seeing an outpatient
medical specialist is 35-38%. We see a shift from using
private options to public specialists from 2000 to 2005
and for two of the outcome variables the changes in
means are statistically significant.
6. Results
Our examination of inequity takes as its starting point
the observed, unstandardized income-related inequality
in health care utilization. In all years, inequality indices
(not reported here) concerning GP care and hospital
outpatient use are negative, reflecting that use is con-
centrated among the poorer income groups. In contrast,
the distribution of private specialist services is pro-rich,
except for number of visits in 2005.
Our main results are based on equations (1)-(3) and
reported in table 2. The horizontal inequity indices for
the main specification are shown in the three columns
to the left of the table, where “need” is defined by age,
gender and self-assessed health, while the two last col-
umns utilize more health information available for 2002
and 2005 only: the number of specific diagnosis
reported and the existence and severity of a chronic dis-
ease. For most health delivery outcomes, the estimated
inequity index is not statistically significant. However,
for the probability of a private specialist visit the index
is statistically significant. Use is distributed in favour of
the rich both in 2000 and 2002 in the main specifica-
tion. The estimated inequity decreases considerably over
the five-year period. Still, we see that for all health utili-
zation measures, additional data on health make the
indices turn more pro-rich (or less pro-poor). Inequity
in the use of a private specialist persists in 2005, with
an inequity index of 0.0472. Therefore our further analy-
sis focuses on inequity in the probability of a private
specialist visit. As the definition of inequity is a contro-
versial issue, we will make our analysis of inequity more
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Table 1 Means of dependent variables and covariates (std.dev. in parenthesis)
2000 (n = 3371) 2002 (n = 2965) 2005 (n = 3002)
dependent variables:
probability of GP visit a) 0.723 0.728 0.697
number of GP visits 2.934 (4.355) 2.798 (4.198) 2.771 (4.548)
probability of private specialist visit 0.164 0.171 0.157
number of private specialist visits a) 0.387 (1.708) 0.343 (1.489) 0.305 (1.211)
probability of hospital outpatient visita) 0.184 0.217 0.208
number of hospital outpatient visits 0.425 (1.815) 0.478 (1.483) 0.448 (1.369)
explanatory variables:
log of household taxed income c) 12.199 (0.537) 12.302 (0.524) 12.347 (0.654)
self-assessed health very good b) 0.295 0.355 0.397
self-assessed health good 0.508 0.483 0.441
self-assessed health fair 0.142 0.113 0.108
self-assessed health poor 0.047 0.045 0.042
self-assessed health very poor 0.008 0.005 0.011
number of specific diagnosis 0.487 (1.026) 0.469 (0.973)
no chronic disease b) 0.642 0.659
chronic disease, no limitations 0.045 0.041
chronic disease, some limitations 0.231 0.212
chronic disease, severe limitations 0.082 0.088
male, age 16-29 b) 0.133 0.123 0.130
male, age 30-44 0.161 0.164 0.161
male, age 45-59 0.137 0.162 0.149
male, age 60-69 0.055 0.062 0.067
female, age 16-29 0.125 0.124 0.124
female, age 30-44 0.175 0.160 0.157
female, age 45-59 0.152 0.140 0.142
female, age 60-69 0.061 0.066 0.069
completed compulsory schooling only b) 0.144 0.124 0.116
completed <3 years upper secondary 0.325 0.290 0.272
completed 3 years upper secondary 0.265 0.297 0.298
completed > 3 years upper secondary 0.265 0.274 0.270
missing data on education 0.005 0.015 0.044
region 1 (capital and surroundings) b) 0.219 0.210 0.221
region 2(eastern except capital area) 0.263 0.266 0.277
region 3 (south-west) 0.142 0.149 0.129
region 4 (west) 0.175 0.167 0.181
region 5 (middle) 0.097 0.103 0.089
region 6 (north) 0.104 0.106 0.103
population>20000 individuals b) 0.432 0.432 0.457
population 2000-20000 individuals 0.255 0.254 0.253
population <2000 individuals 0.314 0.314 0.290
single b) 0.245 0.227 0.260
married 0.521 0.517 0.464
cohabitating 0.144 0.172 0.183
divorced 0.067 0.066 0.070
widow/widower 0.023 0.017 0.023
working > = 30 hours a week b) 0.606 0.602 0.567
disabled 0.070 0.085 0.088
student 0.064 0.064 0.088
doing military service 0.004 0.004 0.002
working part time 0.153 0.149 0.145
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transparent by a decomposition analysis of inequality.
We focus on 2000 and 2005, and on the change in CI
over time. First, we examine which factors contribute
the most to inequality by decomposing the CI indices
year-by-year; see equation (4). Overall, marginal effects
and single variables’ elasticities have the expected sign;
see table 3. Although the propensity to visit a private
specialist is higher the poorer is self-reported health (see
Table 4), the elasticity decreases with ill health. This is
the result of lower means: for instance, in 2000, the pro-
portion reporting “good health” was 50.8% while the
proportion reporting poor or very poor health was only
5.5%.
We learn that the most important explanatory vari-
ables that contribute to pro-rich inequality are, in addi-
tion to income itself, dummies for having higher
education and being a woman aged 45-59. Individuals in
these groups have a high propensity of seeing a private
specialist and are well represented among the better off;
i.e., the concentration index of the variable is positive.
Individuals with poor or very poor health also have a
high positive elasticity, cet. par., but these individuals
tend to belong to the poorer income groups. Therefore,
they contribute negatively to the concentration index.
There are clear geographical differences in the use of
private specialists. Living outside the capital area is asso-
ciated with lower use, especially for those who live in
scarcely populated areas. However, concentration indices
are so small that the impact on income-related inequality
in use is limited. Covariates reflecting activity status do
not seem important in explaining inequality because of
low elasticities. The residual, i.e., the part of the concen-
tration index that cannot be traced back to covariates
included in the decomposition analysis, is large in 2005
both in absolute terms and especially relative to the total
CI index. It has a positive sign, which implies that a lot of
the positive association between income rank and use of
private specialists is unexplained in 2005.
We have done an Oaxaca-type decomposition of
change in CI between 2000 and 2005; see equations (5)
and (6). The results are reported in Table 5. The total
change to be explained is a decrease in inequality of
0.0243. Some of the variables that contribute signifi-
cantly to the year-by-year indices are also important for
explaining change. By far, the largest negative contribu-
tion to change comes from income because the elasticity
of use with respect to income has been drastically
reduced (the marginal effect of log of income is reduced
from 2.9% to 0.7%, see Table 4). Dummies for self-
assessed health also contribute to the decrease in
inequality, but through another channel as their concen-
tration indices have become more negative, meaning
that individuals with worse than “very good health” have
fallen behind in the income distribution. For instance,
the concentration index for reporting poor or very poor
health is -0.206 in 2000 versus -0.232 in 2005, and the
decrease is even more drastic for the group reporting
good health. The impact of a given change in the con-
centration index of a covariate depends on the level of
the elasticity, which is large for all self-assessed health
categories included. Living in a scarcely populated area
has a smaller impact on pro-rich inequality in 2005 than
in 2000. It is associated with low use of private specialist
Table 2 Inequity in the use of doctor services - horizontal
inequity indices
2000 2002 2005 2002 2005
Dependent variable a) (I) (I) (I) (II) (II)
probability of GP visit 0.0091 -0.0031 0.0050 0.0013 0.0068
1.49 -0.49 0.74 0.20 1.03
number of GP visits -0.0109 0.0053 -0.0066 0.0207 0.0072
-0.78 0.37 -0.38 1.48 0.41
probability of private
specialist visit
0.0726 0.0496 0.0449 0.0571 0.0472
3.31 2.16 1.87 2.50 1.97
number of private specialist
visits
0.0612 0.0622 0.0311 0.0781 0.0338
1.23 1.59 0.72 1.94 0.77
probability of outpatient
hospital visit
0.0275 0.0143 -0.0043 0.0222 0.0036
1.37 0.74 -0.22 1.16 0.19
number of outpatient
hospital visits
0.0381 -0.0021 0.0244 0.0129 0.0415
0.81 -0.07 0.79 0.43 1.36
a) Specification (I) uses self-assessed health as the only health need indicator,
while (II) includes additional health information. t-values are given in italics
below each index. Statistically significant indices at 5% level are shown in
bold. Horizontal inequity indices (HI) are based on equations (1)-(3). To
compute HI, we apply eq. (1) but replace yi in (1) with yISi from eq. (3).
Table 1 Means of dependent variables and covariates (std.dev. in parenthesis) (Continued)
inactive in labour market 0.103 0.096 0.110
born in Norway b) 0.943 0.935 0.916
born in Europe except Norway 0.033 0.036 0.048
born outside of Europe 0.024 0.029 0.036
a) When comparing means and proportions in 2000 to 2005 figures, two-tailed test shows that the difference is statistically different from zero at the 5% level.
The test is undertaken for all dependent variables.
b) Reference category.
c) Income is NOK 2005, OECD scale equivalised.
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services and with low income, and thus contributes to
pro-rich inequality in both years but to a lesser degree
in 2005. Whether this is the result of a change in the
concentration index or the elasticity depends on the
base year used in the decomposition. The other vari-
ables reflecting geography, the regional dummies, show
small changes each, but in sum, they contribute to a
decrease in inequality. Large changes exist in contribu-
tions from the dummy for being married or from the
combined dummy for being a student or doing military
service. In both cases, changes are clearly the result of
changes in the elasticities, but the forces behind them
are different. Being a student or doing military service
has a higher marginal effect in 2005 as well as forming a
higher proportion of the 2005 sample, and these indivi-
duals are predominantly found within the low-income
groups, thus their positive change in elasticity contri-
butes to a decrease in inequality. For married people,
the marginal effect declined as well as their sample pro-
portion, and since they are well represented among the
high-income groups, this caused income-related inequal-
ity to decrease. For both students/military service and
married people, the marginal effects changed sign from
2000 to 2005, but in opposite directions; see Table 4.
The change in sign is not important, although it is the
direction of the change that matters.
Table 3 Inequality decomposition for probability of private specialist visit, 2000 and 2005
Elasticities a) Concentration indices Contributions b)
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005
self-assessed health good 0.129 0.187 0.011 -0.020 0.0015 -0.0037
self-assessed health fair 0.091 0.128 -0.047 -0.060 -0.0043 -0.0077
self-assessed health poor or very poor 0.084 0.087 -0.206 -0.232 -0.0174 -0.0201
male, age 30-44 -0.017 -0.006 0.028 0.024 -0.0005 -0.0001
male, age 45-59 0.033 -0.006 0.243 0.201 0.0080 -0.0012
male, age 60-69 0.041 0.014 0.010 0.138 0.0004 0.0020
female, age 16-29 0.067 0.012 -0.175 -0.265 -0.0117 -0.0031
female, age 30-44 0.101 0.032 -0.054 -0.043 -0.0055 -0.0014
female, age 45-59 0.085 0.093 0.198 0.182 0.0168 0.0169
female, age 60-69 0.026 0.043 -0.250 0.013 -0.0064 0.0006
disabled 0.000 0.011 -0.197 -0.158 0.0000 -0.0018
student/military -0.005 0.021 -0.342 -0.421 0.0018 -0.0087
part time 0.023 -0.001 -0.148 -0.152 -0.0034 0.0002
inactive 0.008 -0.005 -0.289 -0.171 -0.0022 0.0009
completed <3 years upper secondary 0.105 0.025 -0.076 -0.075 -0.0080 -0.0019
completed 3 years upper secondary 0.110 0.059 0.006 -0.022 0.0007 -0.0013
completed > 3 years upper secondary 0.089 0.078 0.206 0.211 0.0183 0.0165
missing data on education -0.002 0.001 0.228 -0.220 -0.0004 -0.0002
region 2 -0.042 -0.025 -0.023 -0.013 0.0010 0.0003
region 3 -0.031 -0.017 -0.048 0.057 0.0015 -0.0009
region 4 -0.018 -0.002 -0.041 -0.048 0.0007 0.0001
region 5 -0.037 -0.028 -0.081 -0.088 0.0030 0.0024
region 6 -0.021 -0.038 -0.073 -0.075 0.0015 0.0028
population 2000-20000 individuals -0.041 -0.022 0.036 0.045 -0.0015 -0.0010
population <2000 individuals -0.104 -0.050 -0.086 -0.046 0.0089 0.0023
married 0.045 -0.034 0.095 0.158 0.0042 -0.0053
cohabiting -0.003 -0.005 0.095 0.041 -0.0003 -0.0002
divorced 0.018 -0.008 -0.148 -0.203 -0.0027 0.0015
widow/widower 0.006 -0.007 -0.334 -0.191 -0.0021 0.0014
born_europe 0.000 -0.006 -0.015 -0.058 0.0000 0.0003
born_other -0.007 0.006 -0.306 -0.239 0.0022 -0.0015
income 2.135 0.562 0.020 0.023 0.0427 0.0130
residual 0.0074 0.0288
CI, unstandardised 0.0543 0.0300
a) Elasticities are based on marginal effects from probit estimations, see Table 4.
b) Contributions that are statistically significant at 5%-level are in bold. Bootstrapped standard errors.
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The decomposition analysis leaves the definition of
“need” and inequity to the reader. But if we return to
our original definition, which classifies all inequality
that is not associated with health, age or gender as
inequitable, cf. table 2 we learn from table 3 that the
larger contributions to the decrease in inequity come
from income and covariates reflecting geographical
variation, as well as dummies for student/military and
marital status.
7. Discussion and conclusion
Our finding that there is inequity in the use of specialist
services is well in line with the results from the OECD
research group [1]. In this study, we have refined the
outcome variables, i.e., split specialist services into pri-
vate specialist and hospital outpatient services, and
arrived at the same results as Iversen and Kopperud did
in their analysis using data from 2000 [3]. Clearly,
inequity is found within the usage of private specialists.
The current analysis extends the time frame of previous
studies and benefits from more health information in
the years 2002 and 2005. It shows that although inequity
decreased substantially, it still existed in 2005.
The two studies mentioned above utilized self-assessed
health, age and gender as the only health need indica-
tors. There has been a discussion in the literature
regarding how well the self-assessed health measure cap-
tures “need"; i.e., whether there is a reporting bias by
socio-economic status so that inequity is systematically
under-reported (for references, see [28,29]). Our results
show that including a richer set of health status infor-
mation with more detailed and perhaps “objective” mea-
sures makes the estimated inequality indices more pro-
rich, which is consistent with such a reporting bias. We
see it as an illustration of the argument that including
more health information removes some omitted variable
bias, e.g., unobserved heterogeneities that are correlated
with both income and the use of health services [30].
Since our health delivery outcomes call for non-linear
models, we have applied binary choice or count data
models. Overall, the results are not sensitive to choice
of estimator, ordinary least squares or non-linear, which
is a general finding in the literature [22]. The estimated
indices will depend on at what values of the covariates
the marginal effects are estimated; see equation (2). To
test the sensitivity of our results, we have estimated the
HI indices at median values of the x’s. For the probabil-
ity of a private specialist visit, the indices are very simi-
lar whether estimated at mean or median values.
The bulk of the decrease in inequality is the result of
changes in the elasticities of the covariates; that is, the
driving force is not changes in how income is distribu-
ted with respect to the same covariates. Above all, the
large decrease in the impact of income itself on the
probability of using a private specialist is remarkable. It
cannot be explained by changes in the real value of co-
payments. This finding suggests that income is related
to accessibility and use in a way that the included vari-
ables (for instance, age, education, geography) do not
fully pick up. In general, we interpret the change in elas-
ticities as an indication that access to private specialists
Table 4 Probability of private specialist visit partial
effects after probit
2000 2005
dF/dx P >|
z|
dF/dx P >|
z|
self-assessed health good 0.0419 0.006 0.0665 0.000
self-assessed health fair 0.1053 0.000 0.1859 0.000
self-assessed health poor or very
poor
0.2501 0.000 0.2556 0.000
male, age 30-44 -0.0172 0.547 -0.0055 0.846
male, age 45-59 0.0394 0.224 -0.0063 0.834
male, age 60-69 0.1202 0.006 0.0334 0.385
female, age 16-29 0.0876 0.003 0.0149 0.586
female, age 30-44 0.0954 0.002 0.0324 0.270
female, age 45-59 0.0913 0.007 0.1029 0.002
female, age 60-69 0.0687 0.122 0.0968 0.022
disabled* -0.0003 0.990 0.0200 0.457
student, military* -0.0125 0.662 0.0359 0.214
Part time* 0.0244 0.202 -0.0014 0.947
inactive* 0.0124 0.606 -0.0072 0.769
completed <3 years upper secondary 0.0528 0.016 0.0143 0.543
completed 3 years upper secondary 0.0679 0.005 0.0311 0.211
completed > 3 years upper
secondary
0.0552 0.023 0.0454 0.080
missing data on education -0.0670 0.360 0.0037 0.925
region2* -0.0262 0.143 -0.0141 0.444
region3* -0.0364 0.072 -0.0201 0.355
region4* -0.0165 0.406 -0.0014 0.944
region5* -0.0629 0.006 -0.0487 0.048
region6* -0.0332 0.149 -0.0570 0.013
population 2000-20000 individuals -0.0267 0.079 -0.0138 0.392
population <2000 individuals -0.0543 0.000 -0.0269 0.097
married* 0.0141 0.484 -0.0114 0.579
cohabiting* -0.0036 0.875 -0.0040 0.847
divorced* 0.0440 0.165 -0.0172 0.555
widow_er* 0.0466 0.352 -0.0512 0.234
born_europe* 0.0024 0.943 -0.0195 0.525
born_other* -0.0482 0.206 0.0272 0.455
Income 0.0288 0.073 0.0071 0.527
observed probability 0.164 0.157
predicted probability 0.151 0.146
N 3371 3002
Pseudo-R2 0.053 0.051
Log likelihood -1427.1 -1238.4
Contributions that are statistically significant at 5%-level are in bold.
Bootstrapped standard errors.
Grasdal and Monstad International Journal for Equity in Health 2011, 10:25
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/10/1/25
Page 9 of 12
is less rationed in 2005, as individuals with a low pro-
pensity of seeing a private specialist in 2000 increased
their utilization. This holds for low-income individuals
in general and specifically for some low-income groups
identified in our data, like students or individuals living
in scarcely populated areas.
One could argue that the general increase in activity
levels observed among private specialist both within and
outside hospitals improved access for everyone, but may
have had the largest impact on groups that traditionally
have had low use of private services. However, in our
data, which are restricted to individuals aged below 70,
we see no increase in the probability of a private
specialist visit. Therefore a change in inequity cannot be
driven by a change in activity levels alone. It seems rea-
sonable to relate these findings to the reform in general
practice, as having a regular GP may have made it easier
to get a referral to a private specialist. The RGP scheme
leads to increased capacity and improved access as well
as increased stability in the doctor-patient relationship
[31]. GPs themselves report that their role as gate-
keepers has weakened because of the reform [17]. A
priori, it is not obvious how a weaker gatekeeper role
would affect the degree of inequity. One could expect
this to favour individuals with high levels of education
or high income who are often believed to be better at
Table 5 Change in inequality 2000-2005 in the probability of a private specialist visit, Oaxaca-type decomposition a)
Equation (5) Equation (6)
changeCI*el change_el*CI changeCI*el change_el*CI total change CI
self-assessed health good -0.0059 0.0007 -0.0041 -0.0012 -0.0052
self-assessed health fair -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0022 -0.0034
self-assessed health poor or very poor -0.0022 -0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0006 -0.0027
male, age 30-44 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003
male, age 45-59 0.0002 -0.0094 -0.0014 -0.0078 -0.0092
male, age 60-69 0.0018 -0.0003 0.0052 -0.0036 0.0016
female, age 16-29 -0.0011 0.0096 -0.0060 0.0145 0.0085
female, age 30-44 0.0004 0.0037 0.0011 0.0030 0.0041
female, age 45-59 -0.0015 0.0017 -0.0014 0.0015 0.0002
female, age 60-69 0.0112 -0.0043 0.0067 0.0002 0.0069
disabled 0.0004 -0.0022 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0018
student or doing military service -0.0016 -0.0088 0.0004 -0.0108 -0.0104
part-time 0.0000 0.0035 -0.0001 0.0036 0.0035
inactive -0.0006 0.0037 0.0009 0.0022 0.0031
completed <3 years upper secondary 0.0000 0.0061 0.0001 0.0060 0.0061
completed 3 years upper secondary -0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0031 0.0011 -0.0020
completed > 3 years upper secondary 0.0004 -0.0022 0.0005 -0.0023 -0.0018
missing data on education -0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 -0.0007 0.0002
region 2 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0007
region 3 -0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0033 0.0009 -0.0025
region 4 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0006
region 5 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0006
region 6 0.0001 0.0012 0.0000 0.0012 0.0013
population 2000-20000 individuals -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0005
population <2000 individuals -0.0020 -0.0046 -0.0041 -0.0025 -0.0066
married -0.0021 -0.0074 0.0029 -0.0124 -0.0096
cohabitating 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001
divorced 0.0004 0.0038 -0.0010 0.0052 0.0042
widow/widower -0.0011 0.0046 0.0009 0.0026 0.0036
born_europe 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004
b_other 0.0004 -0.0041 -0.0005 -0.0032 -0.0037
Income 0.0018 -0.0315 0.0067 -0.0364 -0.0297
residual 0.0214
% of change 25% 164% 8% 180%
total change in CI -0.0243
a) The table shows contributions to change in CI index, which are attributed to changes in the elasticity or concentration index of each covariate.
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communicating their health problems with the GP [20].
However, there is no indication of such a development
in our results. Therefore, it seems reasonable to point to
factors that may have pulled in the opposite direction.
Both improved access to a GP where discontinuity in
the patient - doctor relationship was particularly fre-
quent before the reform, and increased responsibility
made explicit by contracted patient lists may have
favoured low SES individuals the most.
Although regions have become more equal with
respect to the use of private specialists, the impact of
regional variation is small given that income is relatively
equally distributed across the country. Thus, the poten-
tial for the hospital ownership reform to have had any
impact on income-related inequality is limited. Further-
more, no large changes in the allocation of resources by
region occurred after the 2002 reform. However, state
ownership of hospitals may have had an indirect effect
on equity [32]. suggests that the state’s taking over of
financial responsibility may have contributed to a rise in
activity through supplementary funding of RHSs, and
that the impact on equity from the hospital reform is
inconclusive.
Given that removing inequity is a declared ambition in
health policy, the development unravelled in this analy-
sis should be welcomed. Specialist services are more
equally distributed in 2005 than in 2000, the inequity in
use of private specialists is less and there is an increase
in mean use of hospital outpatient visits, which is equi-
tably distributed. There is still significant inequity in the
distribution of private specialist visits as well-off indivi-
duals have a higher propensity to be treated by a specia-
list than less well-off individuals of equal need. The
most important factor behind the decrease in horizontal
inequity from 2000 to 2005 is the decrease in the mar-
ginal effect of income on utilization. Still, income and
having higher education are the two covariates that give
the major contributions to the observed pro-rich
inequality in 2005.
In essence, this analysis indicates that organisational
reforms can reduce inequity in health care utilization,
but it also reveals that there are still challenges to be
met in this respect.
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